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Logic Lectures. Gödel’s Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame





This book is at treat. The logic community should thank Miloš Adžić and the late Kosta
Došen for their huge eort in editing Gödel’s lecture notes of his 1939 Basic Logic Course at
Notre Dame. Adžić and Došen have turned a number of handwritten notebooks that served as
the basis of Gödel’s course into—even by modern standards—an elegant logic textbook, which
is a pleasure to read. The edited lecture notes highlight once again what a clear and lucid
thinker Gödel was.
The book consists of an editorial introduction in which the editorial decisions and the
notational conventions are explained, the edited text of Gödel’s logic course, and the source
text in printed form. The source text provides a good idea of the amount of work that has
gone into the editing process. Gödel’s notes are full of abbreviations, a number of passages
are crossed out and every now and then there are interludes in which Gödel is concerned with
seemingly unrelated issues—for example religious questions. The material covered by Gödel
consists of a thorough discussion of propositional logic, an introduction to rst-order logic
and to basic notions of the calculus of classes. The lecture notes end with a short discussion
of Russell’s paradox and the theory of types. In this review I shall start by briey commenting
on the editorial introduction and a number of Adžić and Došen’s editorial decisions. I then
provide a brief summary and discussion of the content of Gödel’s Basic Logic Course. Before
I start I would like to point the interested reader to the work of Adžić and Došen (2016) and
Cassou-Nogues (2009). These works provide an outline of the content of the Gödel’s Notre
Dame lectures and comment on their philosophical and historical signicance.
Editorial Work and Decisions In the editorial introduction Adžić and Došen clearly lay
out their editorial decisions and notational practices. This concerns, for example, the structure
and order of the content in the edited text, which requires some rearrangement in comparison
to the source text, that is, the handwritten notes. Some of the reshuing is suggested by
various page numbering systems used by Gödel, others seems to be required by content and
formulations in the text. In general, Adžić and Došen employ a very conservative editing policy
in that they stay as close as possible to the source text. At places, in particular the beginning
of the lecture (pp. 1-23) and the discussion of the paradoxes (pp. 106-115) this leads to the
reproduction of two versions of the same content within the edited version. In my opinion this
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is slightly unfortunate since I doubt Gödel covered the same material twice during his lecture.
More importantly, including only one version in the main text and relegating the other version,
perhaps in form of an appendix, to the end of the edited text would have made for an even more
enjoyable read.
In contrast to their otherwise very conservative editorial policy the editors have some-
times, as they clearly indicate, included passages in the edited version of Gödel’s lecture notes
that have been crossed out in the handwritten text. I am not entirely convinced that this more
intrusive stance is warranted. While it seems ne to include such passages by means of foot-
notes, as for example in Footnote 7, integrating them into the main body of the text seems to
be more problematic, as they were not intended to be part of the lecture. One example is the
discussion of denite descriptions and Russell’s infamous ‘The King of France is bald’-example
(pp. 106-107), which could have been relegated to a footnote. However, these are a stickler’s
complaints and should not distract from Adžić and Došen’s sound editorial work, which make
the edited text an enjoyable read.
In the editorial introduction Adžić and Došen conne themselves to explaining their edi-
torial decisions and practices, and only give a very brief outline of the lecture’s content. This
contrasts, for example, with the presentation of Gödel’s papers in his Collected Works, edited
by Feferman et al., where each contribution is accompanied by an editorial putting Gödel’s
work into its scientic and historical context. Personally, I always nd it interesting to gain
perspective and to learn more about the scientic-historical context. The fact that this aspect is
missing almost entirely from the editorial introduction is then my only slight disappointment
with respect to this book. Adžić and Došen justify their omission by pointing towards their
also very brief discussion in Adžić and Došen (2016). But why not reproduce or integrate the
paper in the editorial introduction of the book?
Content and Discussion Gödel’s logic course is from a contemporary perspective surpris-
ingly standard and could, after some modications, still be used as an introductory logic text.
It roughly follows the outlines of Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) but supersedes their presenta-
tion with respect to clarity and accessibility. As mentioned, the lecture covers soundness and
completeness of propositional logic, introduces rst-order logic and some basic notions of the
theory of classes.
Gödel starts the lecture by characterizing logic as the “science of the laws of correct thinking”
and from this characterization infers “the theory of inference” and “the theory of logically true
propositions” as the central parts of logic. The target Gödel sets himself for the lectures is to
“ll two gaps of traditional logic, i.e., 1. to provide as far as possible a complete theory of logical
inference and of logically true propositions and 2. to show how all of them can be deduced from a
minimum number of primitive laws.”1
Throughout his lecture Gödel contrasts state-of-the art logic with traditional approaches—
in particular Aristotelean syllogistic but, arguably, also Whitehead and Russell’s Principia,
where the two gaps we have just mentioned are not addressed—and spends some time and
eort on showing how modern logic supersedes the traditional approaches. A prominent ex-
ample is the discussion of the existential presuppositions of a number of Aristotelean moods,
1Compare pp. 1-2 and, especially, pp. 8-9.
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which are not valid modes of inference in the sense of rst-order predicate logic because they
preclude the possibility of predicates with an empty extension. A plausible explanation for this
extended discussion of Aristotelean syllogistic is the desire to promote contemporary logic
amongst philosophers who were in the audience of his lecture. After all, in 1939 logic was
everything but a fully established discipline, especially, in philosophy.
From a contemporary perspective a further very striking feature of Gödel’s notes and the
one aspect that, from this modern perspective, calls for thorough revision is Gödel’s very sloppy
approach to the use/mention distinction. While it is understandable to dispense of quotation
marks in one’s private notes, Gödel also equates objects and their names, predicates and prop-
erties, and, more generally, does not provide any precise denition of the formulas of the re-
spective languages (save a denition of the language itself). Similarly, his discussion of the
notion of strict implication, which he contrasts to material implication, is unclear and could
be reconstructed as “committing the sin of confusing use and mention”.2 But no-one would
accuse Gödel of being confused about use and mention, and, consequently, Gödel’s sloppiness
may show how little the awareness of the distinction is yet reected in the logician’s lingua at
that time. Or, perhaps, Gödel just did not take the use/mention distinction to be particularly
important and in need of explanation.
However, with the exception of his (non-) discussion of the use/mention distinction, Gödel’s
Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame is, as mentioned, surprisingly standard, even from the
contemporary perspective. Gödel launches his investigation by discussing dierent truth-
functional connectives and introduces truth tables. He spends some time motivating the truth
table for material implication and discusses the so-called paradoxes of material implication.
Truth tables are used to show the decidability of propositional logic, that is, we can decide of
any given formula whether it is logically true or not. Gödel also discusses the functional com-
pleteness of propositional logic by illustrating for the case of three propositional variables how
all resulting truth-functions can be dened using the truth functions for ∨ and ¬. However,
we cannot use, as Gödel points out, every two-place connective together with negation. For
example, if we choose the biconditional, or any other truth-function whose outputs consist of
an even number of value T, no truth-function whose outputs consist of an uneven number,
e.g. ∨ or ∧, can be dened.
Having settled the question of primitives for his system Gödel introduces an axiomatic
calculus for propositional logic following the outlines of Hilbert and Ackermann (1928). The
calculus has four axioms and four rules of inference. The latter are the rule of uniform sub-
stitution, modus pones and what Gödel calls the rule of dened symbol. The rule of dened
symbol allows for substitution of formulas with dened symbols for their deniens and vice
versa. Gödel shows the calculus to be sound and complete. In the completeness proof Gödel
appeals to the fact every formula is decided by a “fundamental conjunction” (p. 51) of its propo-
2Compare the discussion in (Marcus, 1961, p. 303) and Quine (1961) for this formulation. On p. 18 Gödel says:
“p ⊃ q could be given the meaning: q is a logical consequence of p, i.e. q can be derived from p by means of a chain
syllogisms.” On a charitable reconstruction this can be reconstructed as ‘p ⊃ q’ is true i ‘q’ is a logical consequence
of ‘p’. On this reconstruction there is no confusion about use and mention. But just before the above quote Gödel
says: “We must not forget that p ⊃ q was understood to mean simply ‘if p then q’ and nothing else (. . . ).” This
suggests that if ⊃ is taken to stand for strict implication it should be read in terms of logical consequence, which
conates use and mention.
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sitional variables, where a fundamental conjunction is a conjunction of propositional variables
and negations thereof. But for a tautology one can show that it is implied by each of its funda-
mental conjunctions. Based on this observation it is then straightforward to show that every
tautology can be proved. By establishing the completeness of his calculus Gödel has lled both
gaps of traditional logic. He has provided a complete theory of logical inference and logically
true propositions and has shown that all logically true propositions can be deduced from a
minimum number of logical laws. The four axioms of his calculus form indeed a minimum
number of logical laws because they are independent, as Gödel highlights. Gödel ends his
discussion of propositional logic by introducing, inspired by the work of Gentzen, a sequent
natural deduction system, which uses ¬ and ⊃ as primitive symbols.
The discussion of predicate logic is more basic in comparison to the discussion of propo-
sitional logic, as important metatheoretical results like completeness, undecidability, and de-
cidability of the monadic fragment of predicate logic are only mentioned rather than proved.
Gödel introduces predicates and individuals, atomic propositions of subject-predicate form,
quantiers and the distinction between a bound and a free variable. He also makes some brief
remarks on the notion of tautology and argues that “an expression is a tautology in a world with
innitely many individuals” (p. 76), that is, in more modern terms, a tautology has to be true in-
dependently of the cardinality of the domain. The axiom system Gödel gives is fairly standard
and extends the propositional calculus by the axiom of universal instantiation and the rule of
generalization in the consequence (together with some rather convoluted substitution rule).
The nal theme Gödel explores in his lecture is the calculus of classes, Russell’s paradox
and the theory of types. Gödel introduces classes, i.e. sets, via predicate-abstracts, which for a
given monadic predicate are supposed to stand for the extension of the predicate. He introduces
a kind of naive comprehension principle and Extensionality and denes basic set-theoretic op-
erations such as union, intersection, and complement. The lecture notes end with a discussion
of the theory of types and Russell’s paradox or, more generally, the paradoxes of the calcu-
lus of classes. The mechanisms that lead to paradox are illustrated by presenting a variant of
Grelling’s paradox. Interestingly, Gödel’s diagnosis is (i) that self-reference is not to be blamed
for paradox but rather (ii) that paradoxes arises since we falsely assume to be quantifying over
the totality of objects whilst “there does not exist a concept of the totality of all objects” (p. 114).
As a consequence, Gödel argues, we must quantify only over objects of a given type, that is,
we should resort to a hierarchy of types to avoid the paradoxes—although the hierarchy is
meant to be less restrictive than Russell’s which attempts to block any form of self-reference.
Indeed, Gödel’s solution to Russell’s paradox is somewhat similar in spirit to the response of
contextualists such as Parsons (1974) and Glanzberg (2004) to the Liar paradox. But in the last
lines of his notes Gödel argues that this strategy is not the correct solution to the “so-called
epistemic paradoxes” (p. 115) such as Epimenides’ paradox and, arguably, the Liar paradox. Un-
fortunately, at this point the notes end, and Gödel’s thoughts, at this stage of his life, about
how these paradoxes should be resolved remain a mystery. Despite this disappointing end
Gödel’s lecture notes of his Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame are a highly recommended read
for logicians and philosophers who want to gain an insight into Gödel’s thoughts at the time
of the lecture and, more generally, the development of logic in the rst half of the 20th century.
Moreover, the insight comes without a cost since a free preprint of the book is available online.
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